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Abstract 
We consider the role of money as a means of payment, store of 
value and medium of exchange. I outline a number of quantitative 
and qualitative experiences of monetary management. Successful 
regimes have sprung up in a variety of surprising places, and 
been sustained with state (centralised) interventions. Although 
the link between state and money, and its standard of identity 
and account may be clear, particularly in earlier stages of 
economic development, the extent to which the state is widely 
felt to hold responsibility for 'sound money' is less clear in 
modern democracies, where there are many other public 
responsibilities implying ongoing trade-offs. 
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"Money is not, properly speaking, one of the subjects of 
commerce; but only the instrument which men have agreed upon to 
facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another. It is none 
of the wheels of trade: It is the oil which renders the motion 
of the wheels more smooth and easy. If we consider any one 
kingdom by itself, it is evident, that the greater or less 
plenty of money is of no consequence; since the prices of 
commodities are always proportioned to the plenty of money..", 
David Hume, Of Money, 1752. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Maintaining a credible form of money is central to the 
organisation of society. Money can take many forms and can be an 
                                                          
1National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 2 Dean Trench 
Street, Westminster, SW1P 3HE and Centre for Macroeconomics. A version 
of this lecture was given as a keynote address at the MMF Annual 
Conference at Kings College London in September 2017.  And an earlier 
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actual precious metal, and hence a commodity, or a paper version 
that may or may not be linked to the value of a commodity and 
increasingly just an electronic chit. So in this paper we shall 
discuss the development of money, the fascination with gold and 
the reasons why we still need money to perform its roles in 
providing operational units of account, means of exchange and a 
store of value. What we shall see is that sorting out money is 
one of the most important things any government, dictator or, 
even builder of a nation state ought to fix. In this sense money 
might be thought to be a critical public good providing critical 
social capital.2 
 
As Hume hints money, coins and even stamps represent value and a 
claim on goods and services. And many of us will remember 
looking in wonder at the many different denominations of 
coloured notes from childhood travels and, perhaps, wondering 
why they were so many types. Older readers may recall the 
decimalisation of Sterling in February 1971: nothing and yet 
everything seemed to change as decimal modernity crowded out 
tanners and ten bob notes.3 In fact, what might have been more 
important was that the world's most important currency, the US$, 
was about to end its formal link to gold in August 1971. That 
act finally meant we had entered the era of fiat money that is 
money which is determined by acts and deeds rather than backed 
by the value of an ancient commodity. 
 
Long before money, its rate of return (which is simply the rate 
at which money loses its value against a basket of goods and 
services, otherwise known as inflation) and its opportunity cost 
(the interest rate that is lost by holding money rather than 
income producing-assets) dominated our national agenda, it had a 
more prosaic aim - simply to facilitate accounting and trade. 
The need for some uniformity in the value of money was pretty 
clear, as was people's ability to spot value, and so beware any 
debaser in case they fell afoul of Gresham's Law, which is 
typically expressed as `bad money drives out good'. People have 
always been pretty good at working out value and Thomas Gresham 
spotted that if two coins, which are both legal tender, have the 
same nominal, or face, value but different values of actual 
commodity content then the one that has the largest discount 
between its face value and actual commodity content will drive 
out usage of the one that has less of a difference between its 
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face value and the actual commodity content. The man who was the 
founder of the Royal Exchange, when envoy to Queen Elizabeth I, 
realised that people will be smart enough to work out, as had 
Copernicus before him, that they might be able to use `bad' 
money for the purchases and keep or save the `good' money for 
their nest eggs (see Shrimplin, 2017). But I think with the 
development of words like standard and sterling, the ultimate 
idea behind the development of commodity backing surely was 
simply to create money that could be trusted to hold its value 
and allow correct inference on the value of goods over time in 
terms of other goods. And so it is the role of money in allowing 
trade to be separated in time and (geographical) space that 
makes its essential to the understanding of modern life.4 
What we will do in this paper is to compress a large amount of 
historical time into a small number of episodes or short 
stories, if you will, mostly with a happy ending. These stories 
provide parable or heuristics that we might use to think about 
the further developments of money. We will though also consider 
a number of standard problems that money is designed to solve 
and then summarise the implications of a well-known model from 
modern economics that has proved very useful for thinking about 
money. As money springs up in this model as a solution that 
avoids autarchy, starvation and a painful old age. But first let 
us look at some indicators of monetary performance over the long 
run and in and out of regimes that were related to commodity 
standards. 
 
2.  Prices, Interest Rates and Money. 
 
Before we consider some historical developments and experiments 
in money, I would like to fix some simple facts, which sit in 
the collective conscience. These `facts' are well known to 
central bank economists but do deserve wider exposure. Let us 
first ask what happens to the change in the prices of goods and 
services not on the year-to-year basis that dominates the 
current pursuit of monetary stability but on an average basis 
over ten years. This is so we can get to grips with what levels 
of inflation people might reasonably have expected or 
experienced over a medium-term planning horizon. We are 
fortunate in the UK to be able to use data that allows us to 
examine broad trends in decennial inflation from the late 17th 
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century, with appropriate splicing, to date.5 Figure 1 shows that 
ten-year average inflation seems low and stable in the commodity 
standard periods, so much so that households and other economic 
agents may well not have concerned themselves with changes in 
the price level over the long run. 
 
 
 
<<<<<Figure 1>>>>> 
 
Indeed, Keynes (1923) put it rather well: 
`The course of events during the nineteenth century favoured 
such ideas [as price stability] ...  the remarkable feature of 
this long period was the relative stability of the price level.  
Approximately the same level of price ruled in or about the 
years 1826, 1841, 1855, 1862, 1867, 1871 and 1915. Prices were 
also level in the years 1844, 1881 and 1914 ...  No wonder that 
we came to believe in the stability of money contracts over a 
long period.' 
 
And yet we can see that when shocks were likely to be have been 
large and uncertainty heightened, an `escape clause' (Bordo and 
Kydland, 1992) was exercised with temporary delinking of money 
from its direct backing with gold, in 1797-1821 and in the 
period around WW1. The period following the probable terminal 
end of the US dollar's link to gold has been characterised by 
persistent inflation and attempts, with varying degrees of 
success, at its moderation. This achievement raises the question 
of why does linking money to a gold or commodity standard 
deliver a stable price level and why might a government or 
central bank consider delinking from something that seems able 
to guarantee some certainty in the price level when times become 
uncertain? 
Let us now compare in Figure 2 - somewhat mixing our horizons 
because a policy interest rate is typically a short run rate and 
the inflation rate here is measured over the longer run - what 
that inflation series looks like compared to Bank Rate over the 
same period. What we note is that under the commodity standards 
the return on short run interest rates, which are closely linked 
to those rates obtained in money markets generally, tended to be 
greater than long run inflation, so that agents could reasonably 
expect strongly positive returns. In fact with long run 
inflation broadly zero in this period, the nominal and real 
interest rates were, in effect, very much the same. The 
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distinction between nominal prices, the cash return or 
requirement to buy an item and its real, or relative, price, 
compared to other goods and services is a crucial distinction as 
it is changes in relative prices that typically provides a 
signal to people to change their behaviour. By conflating 
nominal and real interest rates in a zero inflation world, the 
central bank does not have to concern itself with explaining the 
distinction to markets, firms and households. Whether central 
banks always want to provide clarity in the game it runs against 
economics agents is an issue to which macroeconomics regularly 
returns (Morris and Shin, 2005). 
 
 
  
<<<<<Figure 2>>>>> 
 
If savings in savings instruments that were closely linked to 
policy rates could deliver a positive real return what about 
fluctuations in the price of gold in the long run? Does the 
price of gold rise inexorably because the supply is more or less 
fixed? At least for the benefit of any gold bugs, who seem to be 
large in number and vocal in noise, we might carefully examine 
the relative price of gold in terms of goods and services (and 
then in terms of an index, so that we can broadly relate to the 
value, based to the sterling price of gold at the turn of the 
millennium)? Hardly surprisingly, when the money was directly 
linked to gold at a given price, if the long run price level of 
goods and services was broadly stable, which is a measure of the 
purchasing power of money, then gold prices would also not 
fluctuate. If money was over-issued and devalued against gold, 
people would be inclined to hold gold instead and swap notes for 
gold, this would take notes out circulation and act against the 
over issue and threaten the central bank's gold reserves. 
Maintaining gold convertibility was fundamentally important and 
nothing should thus threaten the exhaustion of reserves. The 
gold standard was essentially a statement that a fixed quantity 
of money could be converted to gold and that a weight of gold 
could be considered money: this mutually binding constraint 
meant that neither gold nor money could fluctuate in price very 
much, as we see in Figure 3 
In a standard textbook model (e.g. Barro, 1979), a commodity 
standard is simply a statement that a given quantity of a 
commodity, for example, an ounce of gold can always be exchanged 
for a set quantity of domestic currency. In the UK, Isaac Newton 
as Master of Mint in 1717 set the ratio as £3 17s 10  d an 
ounce. Secondly, that the quantity of domestic currency in issue 
is limited by some ratio to gold held in reserves at the central 
bank. Therefore under the gold standard money is, in effect, 
circulating as claims on gold. And its quantity of the medium is 
constrained by the quantity of monetary gold and the perceived 
degree to which the issue needs to be backed. As the quantity of 
money is fixed by the supply of monetary gold and the price 
fixed by the exchange rate with gold, there would appear to have 
been a considerable degree of automatic monetary stability. 
 
 
<<<<<Figure 3>>>>> 
In this context we can then try to understand the propensity of 
people to hold narrow money, notes and coins, relative to 
national income, shown in Figure 4. Under the earlier stable 
price period, the rate of return of money was broadly zero and 
remained a stable proportion of income. Many economists 
(starting perhaps with Goodhart and Crockett, 1970) have tried 
to model the demand for money, and in general models involves 
some view money is required to finance current expenditures and 
provides some liquidity insurance against unanticipated shifts 
in income. But what we can also see is that when inflation 
became positive and persistent, the demand for money began a 
long secular decline. With a negative rate of return on holding 
money, even if income is growing and liquidity still an 
important consideration, people simply have a great propensity 
to economise, increasingly so, on narrow money balances.  
 
 
<<<<<Figure 4>>>>> 
 
 
Broadly speaking, what we see from these charts in quite 
challenging. Commodity monies seemed to deliver more inflation 
(a.k.a. price) stability, short term assets seemed to provide a 
positive hedge against any inflation, so that real rates of 
interest were consistently positive, the real gold price was 
stable and there was a stable demand for the notes and coins 
when compared to income. Given the long backdrop of wars, 
industrialisation and the development of modernity, any monetary 
stability was remarkable. And at least at first blush, the 
subsequent absence of monetary stability looks equally as stark. 
And yet after the financial crisis of 2007-8, which has been of 
enormous import in a world of monetary and financial reform, no-
one serious thinks - quite rightly - that we ought to return to 
a commodity standard. Let me see if we can move towards a 
resolution of this puzzle. The answer lies not so much with the 
certainties introduced by a commodity standard where a fixed 
price level in terms of a precious metal will obtain unless 
there are large enough shocks. But the development of a theory 
and responsibility of the government for the quarter-to-quarter, 
year-to-year performance of the economy probably did for this 
`barbarous relic' (Keynes, 1923). Such responsibilities simply 
cannot be discharged with a fixed price regime. Indeed the short 
run volatility in prices from such a regime may itself generate 
much in the way of unwarranted economic fluctuations.6 
 
3.  Some Parables from History. 
 
Let us move swiftly over time and space: a central banker looks 
for foundations and building blocks to build his or her 
theoretical world, or model. Naturally, as the statistician G. 
E. P. Box said: `all models are wrong, but some are useful'. Let 
us see if we can find something useful from the lessons of 
history. We shall look at the development of the first standard 
coins in Ancient Lydia and note the power that this gave to the 
issuer. We shall then move back and South to Mesopotamia and try 
to understand how credit evolved to help communities deal with 
shocks. Given that credit was directed by the State, I wonder 
whether credit was the first monetary policy?  To Song dynasty 
China, where notes replaced cash and allowed trade to expand. 
Standards returned in 18th century England but rather by 
Newtonian accident  The increasingly important state also 
discovered that it would temporarily tamper with monetary 
standards and not only get away with it but promote greater 
prosperity that would otherwise have obtained. Even when money 
disappears and trade is nearly extinguished, for example in a 
prisoner-of-war camp, commodities can spring up and become 
money. And so we find that economic and political unions require 
a common currency, or is it the other way around?, in the form 
of the Act of Union in 1707. 
 
Croesus 
The first historian, Herodotus, tells us the story of the man 
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volatility (or uncertainty) under the gold standard, which was 
surprisingly high compared to postwar regimes. 
who had been the wealthiest man in the ancient world, King 
Croesus of Lydia. Apart from a morality tale about the 
difference between wealth and happiness, richly illustrated by 
heartrending ultimate sadness, Herodotus tells us much about 
money. Croesus' wealth and that of Lydia stemmed not only from 
the naturally occurring alloys of silver and gold, electrum, but 
even more so from the ability to separate the alloy by a 
chemical process, involving common salt, that allowed coins of 
pure gold and silver to be minted. These coins were stamped with 
symbols and because they moved the valuation problem from the 
trader to the ruler, they allowed the Lydians to develop 
unchallenged financial power with their gold coins acting as the 
ancient world's reserve currency. Perhaps the ultimate source of 
this financial power was simply trust in the coinage. In an 
imaginary scene, a recent novel outlined a conversation between 
Croesus and his father, Alyattes:7 
`Can I tell you a secret?' Alyattes pointed at the image of the 
lion. `Without that stamp, it is valued at whatever some metal 
trader tells you it is worth. With that mark, it's worth as much 
as I say it is worth.'...`It's harvest season now. The farmers 
are gathering their wheat from the land.' He reached out a 
finger and tapped the metal disc in Croesus' palm. `If I say so, 
one of these coins will buy the crop of a poor farmer's field. 
Forty of them and you've got the worth of everything that farmer 
will ever produce. The entire value of a common man's life...' 
And so the benefits of seigniorage become manifest. In this way, 
this first global money heralded the modern age by facilitating 
trade but also warned of the excesses and disasters that may 
follow from unfettered, centralised power. And possibly also 
hinted at the regular problems that economics has with the 
theory of value and exchange - how can one financial man at one 
instant and by accident of birth own the entire lifetime real 
output of so many other men? The tension between the financial 
and real sectors remains. 
 
Babylonian Loan Contracts 
The development of Babylonian mathematics (in base 60), allowed 
the calculation of interest, and alongside that of writing, 
allowed records of loan and credit markets to develop as early 
as the fourth millennium BC.8 Exchanges of goods and services in 
an increasingly specialised economy, took place at the first in 
the temple but later at the palace. From such markets, which one 
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Mieroop in Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst (2005). 
can think of as a general store, rations were issued to 
consumers in sizes ordered by the gender, age and importance of 
the subject. These rations were `backed' by donations made by 
producers, such as farmers and fisherman. Given that demand 
might be considered as set in advance and forecastable, it was 
probably negative shocks to production that lead to arrears and 
the need to borrow from others. A wise custodian may have 
promoted the build-up of inventories in good years. Interest 
rates on loans were some 20% for silver and 33% for barley, 
probably because barley was demanded before harvest and paid 
back afterwards when the price was likely to be lower. Without 
money, credit by way of clay tablets was used to record claims 
on producers. And these claims were traded: Babylonian asset 
backed securities, if you will. Once a contract was settled, the 
tablet was soaked in water and the clay ready to be re-used, as 
the `slate was wiped clean'. The remaining tablets are thus 
archaeological remnants of failed loans. 
Under uncertainty in production, credit and loans at interest 
stood ready to smooth the path to consumption and these may even 
be thought of as the first form of monetary policy. Where we 
might think of a monetary policy as something that tries to 
limit inefficient fluctuations in output by the use of tools 
related to the supply of money and credit. My point is not so 
much that loans were some dangerous development but rather once 
we decide to ration and centralise demand and production, 
lending between families of producers might be the only way to 
make the system stand firm in the face of large unanticipated 
shifts in supply by individual farmers. An absence of credit in 
these conditions may have threatened social stability. 
 
Paper Money during the Song Dynasty 
By the third century BC, money had pretty much become 
fundamental to economic exchange in China. But rather than the 
precious metals favoured in the West, the imperial monetary 
system was based on bronze.9 But as well as developing fiat 
bronze coin, it was in China that the first viable paper 
currency was developed. Echoing the (imagined) words of the 
Lydians, `Chinese philosophers and statesman...have universally 
asserted that money is an artefact of the supreme ruling 
authority. It is the ruler's stamp, not the intrinsic value of 
the monetary medium, that confers value.' The Song dynasty was 
founded in 960 and absorbed other kingdoms but there was a 
chronic shortage of bronze coin, which was the means by which 
                                                          
9See Chapter 4, The Origins of Paper Money in China by Richard von 
Glahn in Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst (2005). 
tax was paid. The parallel iron currency did not help much and 
merchants' exchange bills (jiaozi) began to circulate. These 
bills proliferated in a chaotic manner and the right to issue 
was eventually restricted to 16 merchant houses by Zhang Young 
in 1005, the prefect of Chengdu, with standardised size and 
colour. 
The merchants who had issued jiaozi held their own assets in 
(illiquid) land and luxury commodities, leaving the merchant 
houses vulnerable to a liquidity shock. To add to the monetary 
problems, significant quantities of counterfeits started to 
enter circulation. By 1023/4 the incoming prefect, Xue Tian 
created state-run currency bureau which issued notes in both 
restricted denomination and limited life. The note issue had to 
expand with the requirements for trade but in a credible manner 
so that the quantity of notes had some limit to their issuance 
as did, in this case, their life expectancy. Technology also 
underpinned the invention of paper money, as paper-making and 
printing used Mulberry paper and metal printing plates. The 
records allow us to observe a rapid increase in the issue and 
circulation of these notes with no deleterious effects on the 
value of money with 10mn guan in circulation in c1170 and some 
270mn in circulation by the middle of the following century. In 
other words in order to create money of value, it was not simply 
that supply had to be tightly regulated but also that it also 
had to be carefully expanded to meet growing demand. Issuers of 
paper are confronted with the ever-present possibility that 
growing quantities of money may either reflect success and or be 
undermining belief in the currency.10  
 
Newton's gaffe 
One of the foremost intellectuals of his (or any other) day sat 
in his office at the Tower of London and thought hard about the 
correct value of money. His preferred monetary standard, silver, 
was becoming increasingly scarce and it was his responsibility 
to try and correct this matter. Gold coins were driving silver 
ones out of domestic existence. The question he was wrestling 
with was whether he could use available empirical evidence to 
formulate an equation that could be used to pin down the correct 
value of silver and thus save it as the circulating medium. He 
had famously accomplished this kind of task with no little 
success in his earlier incarnation as Lucasian Professor of 
Mathematics at Cambridge. For after leaving Cambridge in 1696, 
                                                          
10The issue of whether money growth reflect the demands of business or 
is inflationary is related to the question of the whether notes or 
bills "are lent in exchange for 'real bills', i.e. titles to real 
value or value in the process of creation", Green (1989).  
Sir Isaac Newton had become Warden of the Mint and succeeded as 
Master of the Mint in 1699, a post he held until his death in 
1727. As well as spending much of his time dealing with 
counterfeiting he also had to ensure that the correct quantity 
of coins circulated to match the demands of industry and 
finance.11 
 
At this time both silver and gold circulated as money. But 
silver was set at a price in Britain that undervalued it in 
terms of gold relative to the value placed on it on the 
Continent by a small margin and relative to the East by an 
incredible margin. In July 1702 Newton notes to Godolphin that 
Gold is higher in France by around 9d. or 10d. in the Guinea, 
than in Holland by 11d, or 12 pence in the Guinea, then in 
Germany and Italy by 12d in the Guinea or above. In Spain and 
Portugal Gold is higher than in England by about 11 d in the 
Guinea,..., which implies a relative undervaluation of around 
1/21 or just under 5%, given 21 silver shillings in a Guinea. 
Later in September 1717, he notes that in China and Japan one 
pound weight of fine gold is worth but nine or ten pounds weight 
of fine silver and in East India may be worth twelve. And this 
low price of gold in proportion to silver carries away all the 
silver from all Europe. He was clearly aware that different 
relative prices of gold in terms of silver was leading to 
international flows of silver to where it was valued most 
highly; these flows were exploiting the differential in silver 
values by a form of `round-tripping'. That is English importers 
of goods from the continent with bills to pay in foreign 
currencies linked to both gold and silver would choose to remit 
silver, which was more expensive there in terms of gold rather 
than sending gold itself. 
In September 1717, Newton, as Master of the Mint, had been asked 
by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to decide 
the correct rate of exchange between the two. He could devalue 
gold to fewer shillings per guinea and match the European price, 
which was typically implied an exchange rate somewhere below 
21s. But he decided to set the exchange at 21 silver shillings 
for a guinea of British gold, which itself was priced in terms 
of domestic currency at £3 17s 10  d. Whilst the gold 
standard is typically dated to have started then, it is 
reasonably clear that it was not designed as such by Newton and 
its ultimate longevity `was largely inadvertent'.12 Apart from 
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two war-time suspensions, from 1797-1819 and again with the 
breakdown of the gold standard during World War I followed by a 
brief resumption from 1925-1931, this price of gold remained 
fixed until 1931.13 Compare that fixed price to the barely 23 
months that Sterling managed to stay pegged to the Deutchemark 
until from October 1990 to September 1992. 
Newton realised that if things be left alone till silver money 
be a little scarcer, the Gold will fall of itself. For people 
are already backward to give Silver for Gold, and will in a 
little time refuse to make payments in Silver without a premium, 
as they do in Spain, and this premium with an abatement in the 
value of Gold shall be lowered by the government, or let alone 
till it falls of itself by the want of silver money. And so he 
foresaw further devaluations of gold in order to bring 
increasingly scarce silver back into circulation. What he did 
not foresee nor adequately understand is that the Gold Guinea at 
21s had become a prominent unit of account and means of 
transaction by industry, trade, banks and even tax collectors: 
it had become the `standard coin' and there was considerable 
opposition to any further devaluations.14 The gold standard 
arrived because Newton's revaluation had produced a gold coin of 
widely useful value and simply drove silver out of circulation, 
so much so that by 1774 silver was demonetised.  
 
Temporary Exit from the Gold Standard 
States can be tested under extreme conditions and the monetary 
constitution is one of the first areas in need of attention. 
During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, economic policy 
was developing at a rapid rate with large persistent deficits to 
fund income tax introduced. With the growth in central bank 
liabilities undermining the possible level of support by 
dwindling gold reserves, suspension of gold convertibility in 
1797 allowed the Bank of England to nurture British monetary 
orthodoxy in extreme conditions. The Order of the Privy 
Council's decision to suspend gold payments on Bank of England 
notes afforded simultaneous protection to the government and the 
Bank in pursuit of the conflicting goals of price stability and 
war finance. The government, the Bank of England and the 
commercial banks formed a loose alliance drawing on due 
political and legal processes and also paid close attention to 
public opinion.15 
                                                          
13There had been a minor suspension in 1745, as a result of the 
Jacobite invasion. 
14Feavearyear, p156-7. 
15See Chadha and Newby (2013) for further details. 
In the 1790s, as usual perhaps in any 10-year period, the 
economy's volatility was expressed in a Canal Mania, an 
existential war involving high levels of government expenditure 
and an unlucky sequence of bad harvests. There were numerous 
reported sightings of French fleets and this led to some 
hoarding of gold by the public and by country banks. As would 
now seem to be the custom, there were bank runs in the North-
East in 18 February 1797. And more of a panic after the reported 
landing of a handful of French soldiers at Fishguard on 22 
February 1797. The result was that the Bank of England's gold 
reserve and the circulating money stock fell rapidly, as money 
was used to claim gold. On Saturday 25 February an emergency 
Privy Council meeting was called for Sunday and King George III, 
the Privy Council and Pitt met in Whitehall and issued an Order 
of the Privy Council: 
 
It is the unanimous opinion of the Board, that it is 
indispensably necessary for the public service, that the 
directors of the Bank of England should forbear issuing any cash 
in payment until the sense of Parliament can be taken on that 
subject and the proper measures adopted thereupon for 
maintaining the means of circulation and supporting the public 
and commercial credit of the kingdom at this important 
conjuncture. 
The Message from the King, 26 February 1797. 
 
George III sent this message to the House on Monday and the Bank 
issued notice of suspension on the same Monday morning. The 
Order of the Privy Council and the House of Commons tied the 
Bank's hands but also and fortunately, indemnified Bank so that 
it could legitimately refuse to pay in gold. The Privy Council 
acted at Bank's suggestion and communicated to all parties 
simultaneously. General meetings in the City of London led to 
public agreement across money markets and merchants that the 
Suspension was the right policy for as long as the war yet to 
have been won. 
It turned out that the ongoing solvency of the Bank of England 
was facilitated by suspension and allowed the Bank to continue 
to make substantial profits throughout the Wars. It became 
acceptable for merchants to continue to trade with non-
convertible Bank of England notes and for the government to 
finance the war effort, even with significant recourse to 
unfunded debt. These aspects combined to create a suspension of 
convertibility that did not undermine the currency. Especially 
after the suspension and until eventual resumption, twelve Acts 
of Parliament were passed committing the monetary system to 
resumption. 
In contrast, the French monetary experiment of the assignats had 
led to a debacle that had cost the French monetary system its 
reputation. The assignats were Revolutionary notes backed by 
confiscated land but without appropriate controls of the 
quantity of issuance and hence on the scale of the backing of 
notes by assets of value. The resulting hyperinflation in the 
last decade of the 18th century meant that Napoleonic finance 
had to evolve within a more rigid and limiting framework. It is 
possible to argue that the debate on the causes of inflation and 
the need to return to the gold standard, the so-called 
Bullionist Controversy, set up much of the intellectual 
framework for so-called British Monetary Orthodoxy, or what we 
might call Sound Money, and led to consensus for early return to 
the Gold Standard on the cessation of hostilities at Newton's 
price.  
 
Cigarettes 
Radford (1945) famously tells the story of how in an economy of 
several thousand prisoners of war with food rations (endowments) 
provided by the Red Cross at regular frequency and some private 
parcels that entered the economy. He writes: most trading was 
for food against cigarettes or other foodstuffs, but cigarettes 
rose from the status of a normal commodity to that of currency. 
Prices adjusted and became known: "it was realised that a tin of 
jam was worth 1/2 lb of margarine plus something else; that a 
cigarette issue was worth several chocolate issues, and a tin of 
diced carrots was worth practically nothing!”. And so relative 
prices were known and expressed in cigarettes near observance, 
but not perfectly so, of the law of one price particularly for 
food but less so for clothes, which depended on quality, age and 
taste. 
Segmented markets were arbitraged away by skillful 
intermediaries: One man capitalised upon his knowledge of Urdu 
by buying meat from the Sikhs and selling butter and jam in 
return: as his operations became better known more and more 
people entered this trade, prices in the Indian Wing 
approximated to those elsewhere. Spot and intra-week credit 
market priced bread and treacle on forward markets. Cigarettes 
were clipped or sweated and subject to Gresham's Law. With both 
monetary and non-monetary demand for cigarettes, as the time 
passed between the arrival of food parcels the price level would 
fall and be bolstered once new money arrived on a Monday 
morning. Arrivals of new prisoners - with demand - would raise 
prices and rumours of arrivals would have the same - sunspot - 
effect but when reserves began to be built up, prices tended to 
be more stable. The money market, albeit in cigarettes, 
facilitated the matching of preferences and endowments at market 
clearing relative prices  
 
The Scottish Pound 
The monetary union between England and Scotland Union was an 
integral element of the economic and political union that 
Checkland (1975) states was `agreed by the two Parliaments to 
merge as one economy, one polity and...one society'. The Bank of 
England had a partial monopoly over note issue 1708 and this was 
gradually extended over time with the legal tender of the 
English pound. A key element of monetary unions has been an 
agreement over debt issues and fiscal transfers. This was 
recognised as early as 1707, when under the Act of Union with 
Scotland, England agreed to pay compensation for future tax 
liabilities. Article 15 of the Act provided the Scots with 
compensation for future tax liabilities (see Clapham p 60); 
England was to pay Scotland the Equivalent: a sum of £398,085 
10s sterling. The Equivalent was a capitalised valuation of the 
existing revenue yield from Scotland and was envisaged as a 
transfer from England to Scotland. Using Gregory King's estimate 
of national income in 1688 of around £50 million (Mitchell, 
1962), this amount was equal to around 0.5%-1.0% of English GDP. 
Ultimately, however, only a small proportion of this was 
actually paid, in part because Exchequer Bills were not 
acceptable north of the border! Any reverse direction of travel 
will require considerable unpicking. 
A story we are piecing together is that money is as much part of 
our social relations, as our culture and language. States large 
or small, federations, existing monetary unions or ones about to 
be born that choose to ignore the need to get the monetary 
constitution right play fast and loose with the economy and also 
with the fabric of society. Central bankers learn to understand 
this innate link between the state and the need to maintain the 
stability of monetary exchange. 
 
4.  Money problems 
 
Money is supposed to be neutral and has no impact on real 
output, income or expenditure or the set of relative prices that 
clear markets. But how can something that allows trade to be 
affected in the first place take no part in the final 
equilibrium outcome? Surely if it is valued then individuals 
will be prepared to pay some fraction of the good and services 
they can buy with the proceeds of their labour in exchange for 
money?  
 
We shall build a reply by first outlining two further key 
problems to which money may offer a solution. In the 1870s 
Jevons outlined the basic problem with barter: we need a double 
coincidence of wants. The person who wants to sell his goat to 
pay for his ale, needs to find someone he wants to sell his ale 
for goat. There is a related problem of verifying that the goat 
is healthy and the ale is good, obviously the latter is easier 
than the former. But if I can find someone like this, the actual 
cost of trade is small because we simply meet and exchange. On 
other hand if we have money in our system, I can sell my goat to 
anyone who wants a goat not just publicans and, armed with that 
money, can purchase ale from any publican, wine bar or off 
licence. In this case, I pay two sets of search costs, assuming 
that everyone is trained to recognise money at birth or that 
counterfeiting does not occur in this goat-ale world. So whilst, 
barter is simple if I can find a match, money is so very useful 
because it increases the number of people with whom I can trade 
and can also allow to take some time in finding the right type 
of ale. The more trading possibilities that there are, the more 
useful money will be as it increase the chance of finding a 
match. I still end up trading my goat for ale and so the 
exchange value is not changed, and so even whilst the money is 
neutral I am better off because my own notion of welfare is 
enhanced. 
 
There is another form of trade impediment that monetary co-
ordination can allay. In the early 20th century, Wicksell 
proposed the following problem of liquidity: investor A wants to 
invest on Monday and her project will not pay-back until 
Wednesday, investor B has money today but wants to invest on 
Tuesday and will get her money back on Thursday but cannot lend 
today to investor A and investor C will get their return from a 
previous investment tomorrow but want to start a new project on 
Wednesday from which she will get her money back on Friday. This 
problem has no bilateral solution as none of A, B or C in any 
pair can clear their supply and demand for funds. 
Imagine though that all returns from investments are pooled or 
deposited in a national or central bank and then made available 
to investors on demand. In this way, the bank will transfer 
money from B to A on Monday, from C to B on Tuesday, from A to C 
on Wednesday, from B to A on Thursday and so on. The bank passes 
the deposit, or liability, to the new investor, as an asset, 
every day and its books balance. Naturally we hope these 
investors make good investment decisions on the quality and 
timeliness of their investments otherwise should one transfer 
fail, the whole system of exchange will collapse. But again, the 
primitive demand for money and its supply is facilitated here 
rather than altered. Money remains neutral and yet a great 
facilitator. 
 
5.  Samuelson's Model. 
 
Modern economists have developed a number of techniques for 
motivating money holdings in the household balance sheet. Money 
holdings might be held because they directly increase household 
utility, or because money (or cash) might be the only way 
households can effect transactions, or money might reduce the 
search costs of households for goods and services. But let us 
understand how the young - developed by Paul Samuelson 
(Samuelson, 1958) - can trade with the old. Imagine if you will 
an endowment economy in which a number of young people who live 
for two periods are given a perishable, non-storable commodity 
that can produce enough food for their two periods of life in a 
single period. Imagine in that same economy, that there are the 
same number of old people living alongside the young who have no 
endowment but will still wish to eat in their second and final 
period of life. How can the young `save' the endowment for their 
old age and how can we get some of the endowment to the old? 
 
There is no easy solution. If the young `give' half their 
endowment to the `old' that may solve the problem for this 
period via altruism. But how can the young be sure that in the 
next period, when they are old, that the as yet unborn young 
will also be quite so generous? If the young keep and eat the 
whole endowment, they will grow rather fat in the first period 
of their lives and develop all kinds of cardiovascular problems 
that will make their old ages somewhat intolerable. A 
traditional answer might be commission a benign dictator, 
perhaps a Lydian or a Babylonian, to capture (or sequestrate) 
half of the endowment and re-allocate it to the old. But there 
is a well-known problem with trying to keep benign dictators 
from turning malign over time, as they tend to take a bigger cut 
for intermediation over time or start to seek priority re-
allocations to friends and family.16 It turns out that a primary 
issue of fiat money, perhaps from a benign dictator who then 
extinguishes him or herself, is the answer. 
                                                          
16This problem is succinctly put as "quis custodiet ipsos custodes" in 
Juneval's Satires. 
 
Imagine our benign dictator issues one unit of durable money to 
each old person and is able to declare that this money is legal 
tender from now until the end of time. Armed with their units of 
(free) money, they can now trade with the young as they can pass 
something to the young which will be valued after the death of 
the current old when the young themselves become old and will 
have to trade with the next generation for their food. This is a 
remarkable result: if the state can issue something that 
everyone knows will be accepted and exchanged generation after 
generation, you can effect trade between generations and allow 
the old to eat and the young to save. What will happen in this 
case, known as the Golden Rule, is that the young will consume 
half their endowment while young trade the rest for money that 
they will use to buy half the endowment of tomorrow's young. 
 
If we issue sufficient money to allow trade between the young 
and old generations at a numeraire price of 1, we may think that 
there is nothing much else about which to worry but only if 
there is no growth in the population or the endowment. If the 
population and/or the endowment grow every year but the quantity 
of money in issue is constant, the only way that the given money 
stock held by the old can purchase the quantity of goods is if 
each unit of money goes further. That is, if the price level 
falls in proportion to the increase in goods available. If the 
price level falls, the rate of return on money is positive and 
the implied interest rate on money balances is positive. 
 
We can thus note in general terms that the price of the 
endowment in terms of money will be determined by the supply of 
money (the number of old times the number of notes) and the 
demand for money (the number of young times the quantity of the 
endowment for sale). If the population starts to grow, and with 
it the endowment every year, and the supply of money remains 
fixed, prices will start to fall and each note will start to buy 
more endowment. Equivalently if the old start popping off early 
and take their money with them, the remaining old will have more 
spending power and the value of money will temporarily increase. 
If the benign dictator gets fat finger syndrome and issues more 
notes, then the price of the endowment in terms of money will 
rise in proportion to that issue. The price level that will 
clear the market for the money and the endowments simultaneously 
is equivalent to a return on money. 
 
Note that some issues remain. The money must be issued in units 
that closely correspond to the value of items to be bought. 
Actually the supply of the correct quantity of small change in a 
gold standard is rather tricky and the failure to address this 
problem may have been responsible for medieval currency 
debasements, as a shortage of small coin may have provided an 
incentive to debase the existing money supply (see Sargent and 
Velde, 2002). Prior to the suspension of convertibility in 
February 1797, the smallest Bank of England note in a 
circulation of just under £10 mn in 1796 was £5. At a time when 
a quartern loaf of bread cost somewhere between 8 to 10d, less 
than a shilling. So that a fiver would you bought you a gross of 
quartern loaves! Today's fiver would deliver around 1 3/4 
quartern loaves, though naturally incomes have gone up in the 
intervening period, I am concerned here with prices and monetary 
quantities.17 
 
There are two further issues that also emerge from this problem. 
What happens if the notes change or start to disappear? In this 
set-up there is no incentive for old people to hoard notes 
because they will not be alive in the next period to spend the 
hoard and by doing so they will go hungry and bring forward the 
time of their deaths. But what if a new dictator demands `that 
the notes that are blue are no longer true and the ones that are 
red can only be used to be fed'? Well if the dictator has a 
central bank that can swap the old blue notes for the new red, 
there may be little disruption to intertemporal trade. But if 
the central bank does not have enough red notes or cannot effect 
exchange quickly, so that the exchange has to take place over 
several periods some disruption to trade will occur and the 
relative prices of the endowment in blue and red notes may 
differ, with the prices in the latter currency somewhat lower 
than those of the former. And so Gresham's Law may even be 
reversed with good money driving out bad. 
 
Finally, as any autonomous changes in the quantity of money may 
affect market clearing prices, the note issuer may have an 
incentive to change the stock of money if the number of young 
being born or the quantity of the endowment for each young 
person changes. Of course the note issuer may wish to let the 
price level adjust but it is possible to maintain stable prices 
by correctly anticipating changes in the demand and supply of 
goods. Why we might want prices to be stable is a question we 
leave aside for the moment. But clearly if you believe that 
changes in prices may lead to households holding the wrong 
quantity of money or admit the possibility that because of 
                                                          
17A quartern loaf represents four imperial pounds of bread and thus 
some 1.8kg. The ONS states that 800g of bread was £1.26 in 2012. This 
means that an equivalent quartern would be £2.86 and we get around 1 
and three quarters of them for a fiver. 
sticky price adjustment that markets may not then clear, it 
might be better to meet rather than frustrate expectations 
formed over long generational experience. 
Again in general once we allow for demand to move and supply to 
respond, there will be a choice for the social planner as to 
whether prices can adjust to clear the market or whether the 
planner may need to alter the level of money in the system to 
bring about adjustment so that the old and young can calculate 
the rate of return on money. This is very much an easier problem 
is the price level is always set at 1. And this is the solution 
offered by a commodity, or gold, standard.18  
 
6.  Money and the State 
 
Getting money to work has been the job of the state. If money 
can allow trade between generations, or analogously between 
different types of people, then it may allow common rules to be 
enforced that increase everyone's welfare. Economists know quite 
well that there are incentives for one person to disobey common 
rules, on the basis that he or she will gain an advantage over 
the rest. But if all disobey then all will lose. The tragedy of 
the commons is reversed with money - the common usage of money 
benefits all and in this world repeated devaluation of money may 
be the ultimate tragedy. That is probably why the gold standard 
and other commodity standards persisted for so long. 
Samuelson in his article likened the Golden Rule that money can 
obtain to a stable form of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Money 
can complete the social compact: When economists say that one of 
the functions of money is to act as a store of wealth and that 
one of money's desirable properties is constancy of value (as 
measured by constancy of average prices), we are entitled to 
ask: How do you know this? Why should prices be stable? On which 
tablets is that injunction written? Perhaps the function of 
money, if it is to serve as an optimal store of wealth, is so to 
change its value as to create that optimal pattern of lifetime 
savings which could otherwise be established by alternative 
social contrivances. 
Somewhere in the centre of a space that contains economics, 
history and politics there is a need for the state to control 
the value of money. The competence of the government in this 
field seems to signal something quite important about the 
                                                          
18Of course, gold prices themselves might be affected by discoveries in 
supply and changes in technology. 
capacity of a state to deal with its collective problems. So 
much so that some consider sound money to be the ultimate public 
good -- supplied by the state but of use to all private agents 
in their ongoing attempt to make plans for the future hampered 
by so many types uncertainty. But if the State can also help 
agents offset shocks when uncertainty is resolved in some 
dimension or other, it is not such a great intellectual leap for 
the State to take responsibility for economic stability. 
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Figure 1: UK Inflation over the Long Run 
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Figure 2: Ten-year rolling Inflation and Bank Rate 
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Figure 3: Gold price relative to other goods and services 
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Figure 4: Narrow Money to Income Ratio 
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